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The non-identity problem, which is much discussed in bioethics, meta-
physics and environmental ethics, is usually examined by philosophers 
because of the diffi culties it raises for our understanding of possible 
harms done to present human agents. In this article, instead of attempt-
ing to solve the non-identical problem, I explore an entirely different fea-
ture of the problem, namely the implications it has for the admissibility 
of outlandish or bizarre thought experiments. I argue that in order to 
sustain the claim that later born selves cannot be harmed (since they are 
in fact different persons), one must rule inadmissible certain kinds of 
modally bizarre imaginary cases. In this paper I explore how one might 
justify such a constraint on outlandish cases and, in so doing, develop 
the outline of a model for distinguishing between admissible and inad-
missible imaginary cases in philosophical debate.
Keywords: Thought experiments, non-identity, philosophical meth-
odology, moral luck.
1. Introduction
The non-identity problem directs our attention to the obligations we 
might have towards people: (i) whose existence we cause in some rel-
evant sense; (ii) whose circumstances, while tolerable, are less than 
ideal but (iii) who would not exist if those less than ideal circumstances 
were improved. In such cases determining whether or not a harm has 
been done to a particular person must be constrained by considerations 
of whether or not less harmful alternative courses of action would have 
led to that person existing. Parfi t’s description of the problem in Rea-
sons and Persons begins with the assertion that the issue of which fu-
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ture people will exist is dependent (at least in part) on when exactly 
the procreation takes place (Parfi t 1984: 358). Parfi t claims that in as-
sessing the relative harm of the circumstances of any birth, one cannot 
compare them with other scenarios involving alternative policies and 
actions in which one would not have been born at all.
Much of the subsequent discussion has focussed on either the ques-
tion of what the proper object of moral concern might be or the implica-
tions it might have for our obligations to future generations. Should it 
be states of affairs or individual persons? However, there is another 
signifi cant feature of this line of reasoning that such discussions ignore; 
namely regarding the set of admissible scenarios for moral assessment. 
The debate tacitly assumes that modal harms—that is, counterfactual 
harms that are either nomically impossible or practically infeasible in 
the circumstances—are not relevant to the assessment of individual 
welfare. The refusal to countenance the outlandish or morally bizarre, 
I shall refer to as the ‘nomic constraint’.1 While Parfi t directs our at-
tention away from worries about individual welfare, in this paper the 
critical focus will be on one of the methodological assumptions that 
drive arguments for shifting away from individual welfare.
The distinctive feature of the discussion herein is that it treats the 
non-identity problem as requiring, amongst other things, constraints 
upon the relevant thought experiments and imaginary scenarios one 
might employ. The outlandish would appear to be ruled out. I suggest 
that reconsidering the non-identity problem in terms of the limits it 
places on what counterfactuals are relevant, sheds fresh light on our 
understanding of the proper role of thought experiments in our moral 
reasoning and, in particular, the role of outlandish or bizarre thought 
experiments play in our reasoning more generally.2 It is not, as some 
would have it, that there is a level or degree of outlandishness beyond 
which we should venture, but rather that the admissibility of the out-
landish depends on the argumentative context—or so I will argue.
2. The standard analysis of non-identity 
and its relevance to applied ethics
The non-identity problem consists in the claim that determining 
whether or not a harm has been done to a particular person must be 
constrained by considerations of whether less harmful alternative 
courses of action would have led to that person existing. Parfi t’s de-
scription of the problem in Reasons and Persons begins with the claim 
1 Jakob Elster explores the admissibility of the outlandish in his 2011 article. See 
also Wilkes 1988 and Pogge 1990.
2 Herein I argue for thought experiments having a variety of roles in philosophical 
reasoning. However, writers in this area typically pick out only one such role; so, for 
instance, Elster (2011) treats them as primarily means of generating intuitions for 
testing our moral principles.
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that whether a particular person exists is dependent (at least in part) 
on when exactly the procreation takes place.
The 14-Year-Old Girl: This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so 
young, she gives this child a bad start in life. Though this will have bad ef-
fects throughout the child’s life, his life will, predictably, be worth living. If 
this girl had waited for several years, she would have had a different child, 
to whom she would have given a better start in life. (Parfi t 1984: 358).
However, Parfi t asserts that in assessing the relative harm of the cir-
cumstances of any birth, one cannot compare them with other scenarios 
involving alternative policies and actions in which one would not have 
been born at all. Thus the child cannot be said to be harmed by his 
mother’s action of conceiving him at fourteen, for the very reason that 
he would not have been born at all if she had conceived later in life.
Notice that what we are concerned with here is one type of coun-
terfactual or modal harm. It is not what the girl did to her child di-
rectly that is under scrutiny but what she didn’t (namely not having 
him when she was eighteen). The focus here is on what an agent could 
have done which was less harmful than what he or she did in fact do. 
We might call this “could-have-done-better” counterfactual harm. We 
can contrast this with cases where we might hold someone responsible 
for some event that they were lucky did not occur, even though it might 
well have. For instance, if I run through a series of red lights with-
out stopping, my action would be held to be morally blameworthy even 
when no harm comes to me or anyone else. This we might call ‘there-
but-for-the-grace-of-god’ harm. In this paper it is the former type of 
harm and consequent blame with which we are concerned.3
Parfi t raises the non-identity problem to argue for what he calls im-
personal as opposed to person-affecting moral frameworks. He claims 
that we should reject the view that an outcome can only be worse if it 
is worse for someone and, further, that we act wrongly only by making 
a particular existing person worse off. Instead we have an obligation to 
do what would maximise overall happiness rather than the happiness 
of particular people.
In recent years the problem has taken centre stage in debates in 
applied ethics concerning the use of new reproductive technologies, 
whether in some cases one would be better off not being born and envi-
ronmental debates about our obligations to future generations.4 In the 
area of bioethics, it is commonly invoked in discussions concerning the 
harms, benefi ts and duties associated with the manipulation and altera-
tion of the genetic make-up of future individuals. If we transform the 
genetic make-up of a future being in such a way that it is no longer the 
same individual, do we harm the child who would have been born had 
3 Whilst this might seem a little odd, it is quite common to defi ne harm in term 
of counterfactuals. See for instance, Feinberg 1986.
4 See, for instance (as just a glimpse into this vast literature) Roberts and 
Wasserman 2009 and Archard and Benatar 2009.
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we not interfered? And who do we benefi t by such interference? There 
is also a debate in the bioethical literature about wrongful life in which 
the non-identity problem has had a signifi cant role. (Archard 2004) How 
can an individual be said to be harmed by being brought into existence 
when the contrast is with a state of affairs in which they do not exist and 
hence one cannot compare their relative state of well being?
In the area of environmental ethics, writers explore the implica-
tions of choosing conservation or degradation of the environment 
(Carter 2001). Suppose we have a choice between these two outcomes. 
Whichever choice we make has consequences, not only for the quality 
of life of those who inhabit the future, but the very identity of those fu-
ture citizens. Suppose we choose degradation. Clearly the lives of those 
who inhabit a degraded environment are worse than those who inhabit 
a non-degraded one. But if they would not have existed in the non-de-
graded environment, and their lives are still suffi ciently good that they 
are better off being born than not being born at all, then can we say 
that they are some how harmed by our choosing the degraded option?
3. Non-identity and thought experiments
The bulk of the specifi cally philosophical discussion of the non-identity 
problem has focused on whether one should indeed become an ‘imper-
sonalist’ or whether there might be a rights-based solution to the prob-
lem. However, these competing responses to the problem all appear to 
accept implicitly a thesis upon which I wish to place some pressure: 
namely that nomic claims about identity should constrain the kinds 
of imaginary scenarios which we might employ to judge the relative 
welfare of a person.5
To see this let us reconsider our initial scenario regarding the four-
teen-year-old mother and compare it with the following case.
 Kangaroo-like Gestation Imagine that human beings had simi-
lar reproductive capacities to those of kangaroos. Kangaroos 
have the ability to delay gestation of fertilised embryos, during 
lean periods, until such time as conditions are suitable for the 
bearing of healthy offspring. If human beings were like kanga-
roos then it would be possible for the fourteen-year-old mother to 
delay the birth of her child until she was eighteen, thus ensuring 
a better life for her child.
In this case it would be the identical child that is born four years later. 
5 In the entry on the Non-identity problem in the Stanford Encylopedia of 
Philosophy, M.A. Roberts notes in passing that in these cases the range of courses 
of action must be consistent with existing medical and genetic technologies. Later 
Roberts notes that since Parfi t fi rst described the case reproductive technologies 
have advanced in a way that makes it, at least, theoretically possible for the 14 year-
old girl to tbe same child as the later born child. Nonetheless Roberts claims that 
probabilities need to be taken into account here and, even with new technology, it is 
very probable that the two children would be non-identical.
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Accordingly, in this scenario if she chose to have the child at 14 when 
she could have had the identical child at say 18, we would much more 
willing to say that she has harmed that particular child.
Far less fancifully, we can readily imagine technology that would 
allow us to take fertilised embryos from the wombs of recently impreg-
nated women and freeze them in a storage facility where they would 
be kept until such time as the woman was ready to gestate the future 
child. So here again our fourteen-year old girl would be able to bear the 
identical child in circumstances more conducive to his over-all wellbe-
ing.
There are also cases we could consider that are much closer to the 
kinds of worries about identity we fi nd in the bioethics literature, 
where the harm involves some genetic disadvantage. To see this con-
sider another scenario:
 The Bridesmaid’s Dress: a woman knows that if she conceives 
in the present month, the child conceived will suffer some seri-
ous genetically-based ailments, but not so severe that the child 
would be better off not existing. However, if she delays con-
ception she will not fi t into her bridesmaid’s dress at wedding 
scheduled for nine and half months time. The woman decides to 
conceive and gives birth to a child.
Following the reasoning of the non-identity problem we cannot say that 
the child is harmed by comparing his welfare with that of a hypotheti-
cal child born a month later, since our knowledge of biology leads us to 
the belief that it would not be the same child. The standard and quite 
sensible view is that different eggs and different sperm make for a dif-
ferent genetic identity. Moreover, genetic identity is assumed to be a 
necessary, if not a suffi cient, condition of personal identity: that is to 
say, one cannot be the same person without being genetically identical.6
But it is, of course, possible to imagine cases whereby the child who 
is born a month later would in fact be genetically identical. The woman 
need only be capable of delaying gestation for the later child to be ge-
netically identical. What these kinds of cases demonstrate is that the 
non-identity of, for instance, later born children is not a necessary truth 
about the world, for there are possible cases where the child born a 
month later or four years later, or even a hundred years later would be 
the same person or at least genetically identical. The child born of the 
woman at the age of fourteen and the child born four years later are not 
necessarily non-identical.
In order to rule out such counter-examples, advocates of the non-
6 In saying this we need to acknowledge explicitly the further problem concerning 
the role of genetic identity in personal identity: merely being genetically identical 
does not make an agent the identical person. However, for our purposes we can put 
that question to one side since the thought in the non-identity problem is simply that 
we do not have genetic identity in later born children and hence no claim of harm can 
be made in relation to such children.
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identity problem must deem inadmissible, when determining relative 
welfare, any counterfactual states of welfare found in conceivable worlds 
that defy our current views of what is possible in the circumstances and 
which will usually be covered by the nomically possible. It is not simply 
non-identity that is determining whether or not harm has occurred in 
our world, but non-identity in circumstances closely resembling ours. 
Let us call this the nomic constraint on the use of thought experiments 
in the assessment of harm (NC). We might formulate it as follows:
 The Nomic Constraint: In assessing the relative moral status of 
any action we should not compare it with counterfactuals that 
are nomically impossible or are impossible in the present cir-
cumstances.
Another way of putting this point is that the non-identity problem rules 
out certain ‘modal harms’ in the assessment of relative welfare. When 
we decide whether a person is harmed by our choosing (or not choos-
ing) a particular course of action, their well-being in possible worlds 
in which, given our current levels of understanding and technology or 
given our understanding of the laws of nature, they could not exist, are 
not relevant. 
This is not uncontroversial. Philosophers, especially in the area of 
metaphysics, make regular use of examples that defy the laws of phys-
ics, as we know them, whilst others—who are in a minority—reject 
their employment. It is useful here to distinguish, roughly following 
Elster (2011: 242), between conceivabilists and realists.7 According to 
the conceivabilist, so long as a case is conceivable then it is legitimate 
to use it as a means of testing our theories. According to the realist, on 
the other hand, only cases that could plausibly occur given the world 
as it is should be used to test our theory. In the area of moral philoso-
phy this view is sometimes defended on the grounds that since moral 
principles are meant for guiding action in the world, cases drawn from 
other worlds are irrelevant. Kathleen Wilkes (1988) makes a similar 
point in relationship to questions of personal identity. Other realists 
argue that we lack the cognitive capacity to apply our intuitive facul-
ties to outlandish cases (Elster 2011: 242).
Clearly the nomic constraint fi ts broadly within realism. Curiously, 
given the context of our discussion, Parfi t’s general view on the mat-
ter would appear to be essentially conceivabilist. In Reasons and Per-
sons, in the midst of a discussion of whether Nozick’s imagined Utility 
Monster is deeply impossible (and hence irrelevant to moral debates 
on public policy), Parfi t notes that ‘even an impossibility may provide 
a test for our moral principles’. He claims that “[W]e cannot simply ig-
nore imagined cases.” (Parfi t 1984: 389). Yet, the non-identity problem 
7 In the main Elster treats imaginary cases as being used to elicit intuitions to 
test our moral principles, a claim which I will challenge later in the paper. However, 
at various points he does acknowledge different roles that thought experiments 
might play.
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only generates the problems it does if we rule out the kinds of imagi-
nary cases outlined above.
Whatever one’s stance in the debate between realism and conceiva-
bilism, it is somewhat anomalous given the regular use of modally out-
landish cases by philosophers, that those exploring the non-identity 
problem have accepted so readily the idea that genetic identity deter-
mines personal identity and hence constrains what might count as a 
possible form of harm.
Let us summarise the line of reasoning thus far. According to Parfi t 
non-identity means that the child born of the 14 year-old girl cannot 
complain of some harm being done to him or her. It is not the case 
that Parfi t claims there is no harm; instead it is harm in terms of the 
overall sum of welfare, rather than harm to any particular single indi-
vidual. However, the non-identity that underpins this argumentative 
move is—as the case of the kangaroos demonstrates—contingent not 
necessary. In focusing solely on contingent non-identity we must rule 
as inadmissible evidence any counter-examples from far-off possible 
worlds. This mode of ruling inadmissible I shall refer to as the ‘nomic 
constraint’.
4. The Non-identity problem and modal moral luck
It would appear then that those debating the implications of the non-
identity theory are agreed on one point at least, namely that nomic 
claims about identity should constrain the kinds of imaginary scenar-
ios that we can legitimately employ to judge the relative welfare of a 
person. Let us focus a little more closely on this feature of the debate. 
What we have here is a nomic constraint on the imaginary scenarios 
and thought experiments that will count as relevant cases in the as-
sessment of individual harm. The suggestion is that we cannot employ 
nomically impossible examples to determine the moral status of action 
or future policy and hence our use of thought experiments in moral phi-
losophy will be constrained here by the extent to which those thought 
experiments introduce cases which are nomically possible.
One further interesting consequence of this is that it appears to 
entail a commitment to the idea of what we might call “modal moral 
luck”, according to which the moral status of an action is contingent 
upon which particular possible world one inhabits. The term is related 
to the idea of ‘moral luck’ that Bernard William famously proposed to 
cover cases where the moral status of an action or even a whole life 
depends upon how things turn out. Moral luck describes cases where 
“an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgement”, 
despite the fact that a signifi cant aspect of what that agent is assessed 
for “depends on factors beyond his control” (Nelkin 2004). In the Kan-
tian tradition matters are entirely different for there it is assumed that 
we are only judged in terms of the motives with which we act. Our 
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intuitions might well be thought to support the Kantian view since the 
very idea of moral luck sounds oxymoronic. Further it seems unfair to 
be judged by circumstances that are outside of our control. Yet at the 
same time our ordinary moral thinking seems to suggest that there is 
such a moral phenomenon. As Thomas Nagel notes:
Where a signifi cant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond 
his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral 
judgement, it can be called moral luck. (Nagel 1979: 59)
In order to illustrate his point, Williams tells the story of the painter 
Paul Gauguin. Gauguin left his wife and family in France to pursue 
his career as a painter. Williams’ point is that if it had turned out that 
Gauguin was a mediocre painter rather than a gifted artist, then we 
would judge his life rather differently. The general idea then is that we 
are more hostages to moral fortune than the standard Kantian analysis 
would have us believe.
Modal moral luck, by way of contrast, involves cases where the moral 
assessment will differ according to what world, of all those possible, it is 
in which the action occurs. Thomas Nagel raises a related (although far 
less extensive) idea when he discusses the category of ‘circumstantial 
luck’ (Nagel 1979). Circumstantial luck is luck about the circumstances 
in which one fi nds oneself. Nagel’s example concerns Nazi collaborators 
in Germany during the period of the Third Reich. We condemn them for 
the morally appalling acts they performed, but if they had been shifted 
to South America in, say, 1929, perhaps they might have led morally 
exemplary lives. If we provide a different moral evaluation of the lives 
of the Nazi collaborators with their hypothetical counterparts in South 
America, then we have a case of what Nagel calls circumstantial moral 
luck. Modal moral luck extends the idea of relevant hypothetical coun-
terparts to a much wider range of possible worlds, including those that 
we might think of as being nomically impossible.
According to the idea of modal luck then the moral status of one’s 
action is contingent upon what possible world we inhabit. To illustrate 
the idea let us return to Parfi t’s original example of the fourteen-year 
old girl. Does the fourteen-year old girl harm her son by having him 
when she is fourteen? Is he harmed by not being born four years later? 
On this line of reasoning the moral status of her action depends upon 
what possible world it is that she inhabits. In the world where human 
beings cannot delay gestation of fertilised embryos then she does not 
harm him because he would not exist. In the world where human be-
ings can perform this procreative trick, then she does harm him. The 
moral status of her action is thus contingent upon which possible world 
she inhabits. It is, we might say, a matter of modal moral luck whether 
she can be said to have harmed her son.
Modal luck would cover what we might call ‘epistemic cases’ where 
our lack of knowledge makes an outcome impossibly remote for us. 
There will be cases where our ignorance makes it impossible for us to 
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take advantage of some harm-lessening process. Imagine that if we 
drink the right admixture of iodine and calcium that we can delay ges-
tation for up to ten years. In this case again the fourteen year old could 
take this concoction and give birth to the same child four years later 
when she is better placed to raise him. In a world where this technique 
is widely known we might well judge the action of the woman of not 
delaying the pregnancy quite differently from we would in a world in 
which this information was not available. Again the fact that the same 
action is evaluated quite differently is a matter of modal moral luck.
Modal luck has interesting implications, not merely for debates re-
garding how we might determine whether harm has occurred and what 
kinds of counterfactual considerations are relevant, but also for our 
use of thought experiments in ethics more generally. Think about this 
in relationship to one of the more notorious thought experiments in 
the ethical literature, Michael Tooley’s case of the superkittens (Tooley 
1983). Tooley’s target was the potentiality principle that is often used 
to oppose abortion. In attacking the idea that it is wrong to kill foetuses 
because they are potential persons, Tooley employs a thought-experi-
ment involving highly rational cats to generate a putative reductio ad 
absurdum. He writes:
Suppose that at some time in the future a chemical is discovered that, when 
injected into the brain of a kitten, causes it to develop into a cat possessing 
a brain of the sort possessed by normal adult human beings. Such cats will 
be able to think, to use language, to make decisions, to envisage a future for 
themselves, and so on—since they will have all of the psychological capaci-
ties possessed by adult humans. If one maintains that it is seriously wrong 
to kill adult members of the species Homo sapiens, one must also…..hold 
that it would be seriously wrong to kill cats that have undergone such a 
process of development. (Tooley 1983: 191)
He then claims that it follows that it is prima facie no more seriously 
wrong to kill a human organism that is a potential person, but not a 
person, than it is intentionally to refrain from injecting a kitten with 
the special chemical, and to kill it instead. This he suggests shows why 
the potentiality principle is wrong for in the example provided above it 
would be intrinsically wrong to refrain from injecting a kitten and kill-
ing it instead. The claim that it is intrinsically wrong to kill a foetus is 
therefore putatively reduced to absurdity.
However, we should be extremely wary of accepting this thought-
experiment as a refuter. To do so would be to overlook the fact that we 
are making decisions in this world and the contingent facts about how 
this world is actually constructed are relevant to how we frame our 
decisions. In the possible world in which we possessed such a chemical, 
refraining from injecting a kitten and subsequently killing it would 
be morally equivalent to killing a foetus (and that says nothing about 
whether or not it would be intrinsically wrong). We might think of this 
as a form of modal moral luck. For the kitten-killer it will be a mat-
ter of ‘modal moral luck’ whether or not he inhabits a possible world 
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in which killing kittens is equivalent to killing foetuses. But in our 
world they are not morally equivalent along the lines of comparison 
that Tooley discusses.
We can restate the point in the following way. Imagine two different 
people in two different worlds, World A and World B, who both acciden-
tally run-over a young kitten. In world A we have the drug to turn cats 
into supercats whereas in B we do not. In the world of potential super-
cats the action has more bad-making features than in world B. The ac-
tions may well be equivalent in terms of their responsibility, causality 
and intention. But we might say that killing A is morally worse and, 
that it is so for the driver concerned, is a matter of modal moral luck.
5. Modal Constraints and the Assessment of Harm
However, nomic constraints on counterfactuals are decidedly odd in 
philosophy. How far would we want to generalise this ‘nomism’? Would 
we want to adhere to it as a general principle, for bizarre counterfactu-
als are commonplace in philosophical debate. Think, for instance, in 
metaphysics of discussions of the swampman who emerges out of the 
swamp with all of the same properties as an ordinary human.8 Equally, 
in the philosophy of mind there has been a great deal of discussion of 
zombies who behave as if they are conscious but in fact are not.9
If we turn our attention to ethics and applied philosophy again we 
fi nd considerable use of what one might think of as ‘bizarre examples’. 
Think, for example, of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s case of the people-seeds 
that she raises when discussing the morality of abortion (Thomson 
1971). These people-seeds fl oat around in the atmosphere and if one 
does not place the appropriate guards on one’s windows then they will 
fl oat inside one’s house, attach to the carpet and begin growing into 
people.
The use of bizarre examples, then, is standard-practice in many 
areas of philosophy in general and many would regard it as intellec-
tually productive. Although there are realist critics of the modally bi-
zarre—most notably Kathleen Wilkes and Thomas Pogge—the demand 
for constraints in terms of nomic possibility is somewhat anomalous. 
Realism of this variety would be thought by many as stymieing philo-
sophical analysis and thus would seem to require justifi cation.10 The 
default position within philosophy is surely that the modally bizarre 
are admissible.
A further possible problem with the nomic constraint concerns its 
implications for commonly employed notions in moral philosophy such 
as universalizability. Does it restrict the circumstances in which it is 
8 See, for instance, Davidson 1987 and Millikan 1996.
9 For useful surveys of this literature see Kirk 2005, Marcus 2004, Cottrell 1999 
and Dennett 1995, 1991.
10 See Wilkes 1988 and Pogge 1990.
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possible for me to imagine myself? Universalizability involves (roughly 
speaking) the idea that in determining the moral status of a proposed 
action we need to ask ourselves fi rstly what the world would be like 
if everyone did it and secondly how would we feel if it were to be per-
formed on us. Any action to which we would not assent in these hypo-
thetical circumstances is morally impermissible. The nomic constraint 
is unlikely to create diffi culties for the fi rst element since universalis-
ing some action will rarely require invoking impossible states of affairs. 
However, problems do arise when we consider the second condition re-
garding thinking oneself into the shoes of another. If I am supposed to 
imagine what it would be like to be a member of a very different culture 
and imagine how I would feel about certain forms of discrimination, 
then this seems to require that I imagine something impossible, name-
ly that I am a very different person than I am. If non-identity rules out 
children born four years later, then a fortiori it might seem to rule out 
such radical transformations. But perhaps this is a red herring since 
the non-identity problem concerns what are possible counterfactual 
conditions for a particular person, not how I might imagine myself. Be 
that as it may, the signifi cant point for our purposes is that, in deter-
mining relative welfare, the non-identity problem deems inadmissible 
any harm found in conceivable worlds that defy our current views of 
the nomically possible. However, if this were to be taken as a more gen-
eral principle in philosophy, would it ‘poison the well’ of moral theory, 
since it would undermine our use of thought experiments?
For realists, however, who wish to eliminate the use of the outland-
ish these are not costs but desirable outcomes. Yet, the view is contro-
versial. Must anyone who regards the non-identity as raising genuine 
philosophical issues about the nature of harm thereby commit them-
selves to realism about thought experiments?
Fortunately, this would appear not to be the case. It need not have 
such extreme ramifi cations for philosophical method if we limit the 
scope of the nomic constraint that underpins it. Reconsider the topic 
out of which the non-identity problem arose. It concerns harm and, 
more specifi cally, actionable harm. In this case we are concerned with 
assigning responsibility—and perhaps blame—for harms done to fu-
ture people by dint of the timing of their birth or their genetic make-up. 
In pursuing such questions we are constrained by what could reason-
ably be expected in the current circumstances, not by what is logically 
or metaphysically possible. Harm, in this context, is a practical notion 
that does not need to be evaluated in relation to every possible world.
The upshot is that we need to revise our view about what assump-
tions underpin the non-identity problem. Our original nomic constraint 
advised that when assessing the relative moral status of any action, 
we should not compare it with counterfactuals that are nomically im-
possible or are impossible in the present circumstances. However, in 
order to generate the non-identity problem this constraint need not be 
generalised. Relying on the nomic constraint in the context of debates 
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about harm need not commit one to it as a more general principle for 
moral theory, or indeed for philosophical theory more generally. Cast 
in a more modest way, then, the constraint can be rewritten as follows:
 A modal constraint with restricted scope: In assessing the rela-
tive moral status of any action in terms of actionable harm we 
should not compare it with counterfactuals that are nomically 
impossible or impossible in the present circumstances.
This weaker version of the constraint on imaginary cases, unlike stron-
ger forms of realism, does not have such serious implications for philo-
sophical method since it allows for the continuation of bizarre thought 
experiments in general, but rules out specifi c cases where there is 
actionable harm. It rules out ‘kangaroo-style’ cases when discussing 
harm in the current context but does not rule out counterfactual forms 
of harm, such as in the case of the inebriated driver who fortunately 
harms nobody, from being relevant when assessing actionable harm. 
Crudely speaking, drunk drivers are in and kangaroos are out.
There remain, we must admit, vexed questions of how to determine 
what might be impossible in the current circumstances. There are two 
closely related parts to this diffi culty. The fi rst concerns how we opera-
tionalize the constraint. If one is assessing harm—and this is particu-
larly true if that harm were to have any legal ramifi cations—how can 
one be sure what really is impossible? There is always the possibility 
that some states of affairs are in fact possible despite our ignorance of 
that fact. Secondly, rapid technological changes can mean that what 
had been diffi cult even to imagine at one point in history can change 
overnight. Nonetheless, as troubling as these considerations of the as-
sessment of harm might be, they do not undermine the general point 
about the legitimacy of ruling some thought experiments inadmissible 
on such grounds.
6. Modal constraints and the argumentative context 
Thus far I have argued that the modal constraints associated with the 
non-identity problem are justifi able because we are concerned with ac-
tionable harm. At this point I wish to draw a more general lesson about 
the admissibility of outlandish thought experiments. Some critics, such 
as Elster, focus primarily, when assessing admissibility, on the modal-
ity of particular thought experiments. However, I beg to differ. Out-
landishness or bizarre modality is not the central issue in relation to 
the admissibility of thought experiments, rather it is the argumentative 
context. It is not the violation of what is possible alone that justifi es re-
jecting the claim that the child is harmed by not being born four years 
later. Instead it is the violation of what is possible in an argumenta-
tive context in which such violations matter that will justify constraint. 
‘Modal violation’ is but one possible relevant factor when assessing such 
admissibility but there will be many others. The general idea is that 
constraints can be justifi ed in relation to the argumentative context.
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The approach I sketch briefl y below involves what we might call 
‘thought experimental pragmatics’, in which the admissibility of a 
thought experiments will be determined not by the specifi c features 
or inherent modal nature of the thought experiment itself, but by 
the role that it plays in the argumentative context. We can illustrate 
this by drawing an analogy with pragmatics in linguistics and the 
philosophy of language (Lycan 1995). There the term ‘pragmatics’ 
refers to approaches that explore the contextual dimensions of our use 
of language and the context-dependence of various features of linguistic 
interpretation (Korta and Perry 2011). The analogous idea proposed 
here is that the need for modal constraints should be determined with 
reference to the argumentative context.
In order to explicate this approach I begin by considering the diverse 
roles that thought experiments play in argumentation. There are, I 
suggest, a number of distinct functions that thought experiments play 
in arguments, which importantly cannot be reduced to a single function. 
Below I identify three such functions; although the list is not intended 
to be exhaustive. One consequence of this approach is that there is 
unlikely to be a single characterisation of what makes for a successful 
thought experimentation. (Here I have in mind the kind of regimentation 
that Soren Haggqvist gives in his 1996 book Thought Experiments in 
Philosophy). Note also the difference with Roy Sorensen’s account in 
Thought Experiments (1992) in which Sorensen argues that the single 
role of thought experiments is to test modal consequences. Sorensen 
leavens this conception of function with the comment that the ‘apparent 
narrowness of its function eases once we realize that there are many 
kinds of necessity’ (Sorensen 1992: 6). Jacob Elster notes that imagi-
nary cases are used in ethics to elicit intuitions against which moral 
principles might be tested and presumably elsewhere in philosophy 
they are used to challenge other principles (Elster 2011: 241), be they 
metaphysical or epistemological and so on.11 Again he only mentions 
one function. However, on the account suggested herein, there is no 
such single function, no matter how broadly construed.
There are, then, at least three roles that thought experiments play 
in philosophical arguments. First, some thought experiments function 
as counter-examples in philosophical disputations. In responding to a 
theory or a defi nition that is intended to be either necessarily or univer-
sally true one might attack the position either by providing a counter-
example or by demonstrating that the theory has absurd consequenc-
es.12 The use of such refuters is a commonplace in moral philosophy. 
For example, in responding to the claim that it is always wrong to lie, 
an opponent of this view might argue that at least some lies are per-
11 As the article proceeds, Elster does mention various uses of imaginary cases 
that do not fi t quite so neatly into this understanding of their function.
12 Roy Sorenson refers to these thought experiments as ‘refuters’, although, as he 
notes, not all refuters involve thought experiments (see Sorenson 1992: 153).
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missible and do so by providing a case where most people would admit 
lying was acceptable (such as when telling a so-called ‘white lie’). The 
second category of thought experiments involves what we might refer 
to as ‘intuition pumps’. This is a term that is used in a variety of ways 
by philosophers—sometimes as a synonym for thought experiments 
and sometimes to refer to what the author believes is a pernicious mode 
of reasoning—but one common usage is where it refers to a class of 
thought experiments that aim to lead us, via our reactions to a single 
thought experiment, towards some general kind of conclusion. Trolley 
problems might be a case in point. Here we are meant to infer from the 
fact that we would choose to save the fi ve rather than the one person 
on the track that numbers do count morally.13 A third category of use to 
which thought experiments are often put by philosophers is as ‘clarifi -
catory devices’ where the aim is to clarify our views on a diffi cult topic. 
Perhaps the most widespread of these are the ‘commitment cleavers’, 
that is, cases where thought experiments are used to enhance our un-
derstanding by teasing apart distinct, but easily confl ated, principles. 
Presumably this is at least part of the signifi cance of the story in the 
Republic of the Ring of Gyges that Plato raise in the midst of a debate 
about the nature of justice (Plato 1974: 36). The tale of this ring enables 
us to distinguish between those who endorse justice on the grounds of 
prudence and those who do so because they regard acting fairly to be 
a fundamental moral obligation that holds regardless of any benefi ts 
that might or might not accrue from being seen to act justly. Through 
Plato’s use of this dramatic device, the interlocutors in the Republic are 
forced to be more specifi c about their ethical and political commitments. 
In the end is it mere prudence or our intrinsic duty to act justly that 
underpins their publicly avowed commitment to justice?14 Sometimes 
these argumentative devices are designed so as to test or clarify what 
a theory—as opposed to a person—might be committed. One might, for 
instance, devise a thought experiment that illuminates the difference 
between a Kantian and a Utilitarian approach to moral issues.
With this taxonomy in mind—and, more importantly, being ap-
prised of the thesis that thought experiments play a variety of roles 
in argumentation—let us now return to the issue of method in ethics 
and how the idea of modal constraints relating to possibility might best 
be understood. (My assumption continues to be that Parfi t’s problem 
raises important questions for ethical methodology). The claim herein 
is that the thought experiments philosophers often use in ethics can—
13 One diffi culty with attempting to use thought experiments in this manner is 
that people’s responses to thought experiments are often surprisingly varied. Hence 
they do not always pump our intuitions in the direction that the interlocutor hopes 
or expects.
14 As C. L. Ten notes such thought experiments help us to determine whether a 
particular principle or commitment is “fundamental or subordinate” (Ten 1987: 21).
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and should—be constrained, if the argumentative context renders 
more modally extravagant cases to be irrelevant. To illustrate how 
this would work, consider the following cases. If, for example, we were 
debating the rightness or wrongness of incarcerating human beings 
without trial it would be inadmissible in this context to introduce, as 
a relevant case, the example of possible people who enjoy being incar-
cerated. Given the practical context, such beings would not provide 
counter-examples to claims that it is wrong to imprison without trial. 
What matters here is not so much the content of the example in and of 
itself, but rather the context of the topic under discussion. With respect 
to the non-identity problem the argumentative context involves action-
able harm). Yet, there will be other cases in which we are considering 
general principles of morality where it might well be appropriate to 
raise the moral consequences of persons who enjoy being incarcerated. 
Consider a further example. Suppose that two philosophers are de-
bating the issue of whether or not a pregnant women should have more 
say in any decision about whether or not to continue with a pregnancy 
than the man who fathered the foetus. Now suppose that in the context 
of this debate one of the disputants (let’s call him ‘Jim’ for the sake of 
the example) raises the following imaginary scenario.
 Ectogenetic birth: Imagine a world in which human beings can 
be gestated entirely outside of the womb, in perhaps an incuba-
tor of some kind. In such a world there is no reason to think 
that the female parent has more rights than the male parent in 
determining whether the gestation should continue.
Jim argues that this example undermines the claim that women should 
have greater say than men in the determination of whether gestation 
should continue. The idea would be that the moral claim of women hav-
ing greater rights here does not hold in all possible worlds for the very 
reason that it is not true all possible worlds that women will be respon-
sible for the gestation. So far so good, but in line with the preceding 
dictum about context (i.e. our modal constraint), our friend Jim cannot 
use the case to make claims about whether or not women should have 
more say now in circumstances where women are in fact responsible 
for gestation. In this case, contingent features of the problem—namely 
the fact that we do not currently have ectogenetic birth—are relevant 
to our moral deliberations and should not be over-ruled by merely 
logically possible cases. And again it is a matter of modal moral luck 
whether or not a man might be thought to have less rights in determin-
ing whether gestation should continue.
The more general lesson here is not that we should always con-
strain our thought experimentation by contingent empirical realities, 
nor that bizarre examples should be expunged from moral thinking 
but, simply, that there will be cases—particularly in applied ethics and 
political philosophy—where the argumentative context is such that as-
sessment of contingent factors about what is actually possible matters. 
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It is the argumentative context not the outlandishness of any thought 
experiment that should be our primary concern in determining admis-
sibility. We must not rule out outlandish experiments merely because 
they are outlandish.
7. Concluding remarks
The non-identity problem raises diffi cult questions about whether it 
is possible to harm another person who, if we had not acted as we did, 
would not have existed. A signifi cant assumption here is that if the 
harmful action had not been undertaken then the person would not ex-
ist. Yet, in each of the cases raised, it is entirely possible to imagine fu-
ture scenarios—which are admittedly outlandish—in which the person 
existed without the harm. In order to sustain the claim that we cannot 
harm such individuals, one must rule out such imaginary scenarios. 
But why rule out these imaginary cases? My aim was to discover what 
might justify such constraints that are curious given the kinds of sce-
narios regularly explored in philosophical debate.
After considering the ‘nomic constraint’ (which would rule out all 
modally bizarre scenarios) I proposed, by way of justifi cation, a more 
moderate constraint that focuses on the fact that in this instance we 
are concerned with actionable harm and hence the kind of scenarios 
that are relevant should be restricted by that concern. Scenarios are 
restricted in the non-identity problem because of the argumentative 
context. This is the core idea of the approach of ‘thought experiment 
pragmatics’.
The more general claim I made is that it is the argumentative 
context, not the modal content of a particular imaginary case, which 
determines whether it is admissible. The approach defended here is 
midway between, on the one hand, those who would adopt an ‘any-
thing-goes’ policy and, on the other, those like Kathleen Wilkes who 
regard outlandish thought experiments as intellectually pernicious 
(Wilkes 1988). There are, I would suggest, genuine grounds for limit-
ing in certain debates the range of thought experiments that are to be 
regarded as admissible. This is an important lesson for areas of applied 
philosophy. While matters are somewhat different when considering, 
for instance, general moral principles, when the issue is very much a 
practical question of applied philosophy, such as is the case with the 
assessment of responsibility and actionable harm, it is appropriate to 
limit the range of relevant cases. The default position should be that 
outlandish examples are admissible until such time as an interlocu-
tor can demonstrate that, given the context, they are irrelevant to the 
debate at hand.
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